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DERELICTION OF DUTY: WHEN MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS VOTE FOR LAWS THEY BELIEVE
TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Anant Raut*
J. Benjamin Schrader †
[Y]ou swore an oath, as I did, when you became Members of this
body to uphold the Constitution of the United States. . . . You
cannot . . . ignore your own duty properly to interpret the Con-
stitution, which you have inherited after 200 years of history. . . .
[T]o duck your responsibility on the ground that sometime, at
some future date, the Supreme Court will have final authority
over the question is to ignore the oath which you swore when
you became a Member of this body.
—Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), 19841
INTRODUCTION
Members of Congress have an obligation not to vote for legis-
lation they believe to be unconstitutional.  That obligation stems
from the oath that every Senator and Representative takes to sup-
port and defend the Constitution, and is bolstered by the defer-
ence afforded by the courts which presume that Congress does not
intentionally pass unconstitutional legislation.
Occasionally, however, some Senators and Representatives
vote for legislation they believe to be unconstitutional.  This oc-
curred most recently with the passage of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, during which two Senators and one Representative
voted in favor of the legislation despite their belief that it did not
pass constitutional muster.  This Article argues that voting in such
a manner is a dereliction of constitutional duty.  Furthermore, this
Article demonstrates how the modern legislative climate became
conducive to this sort of behavior by tracing the shift from a
Madison–Jackson model of coordinate construction to one of judi-
cial superiority in which members of Congress defer questions of
* 2001 graduate of Harvard Law School and an associate at Counsel, Committee
on the Judiciary, US House of Representatives.
† Second-year student at Vanderbilt University Law School and a member of the
Vanderbilt Law Review.
1 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707, 721 (1985) (citing 130 CONG. REC. 10844, 10862 (1984) (statement of Sen.
Gorton)).
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constitutionality to the courts without conducting a searching con-
stitutional analysis themselves.  This Article then examines the po-
tential consequences of this voting posture for (i) the Senators and
Representatives who willfully vote for a bill they believe to be un-
constitutional; (ii) a President faced with signing such a bill; and
(iii) the courts which will later hear challenges to the new legisla-
tion.  This Article concludes with a prediction of how these conse-
quences may permanently change legislative debate.
I. CONGRESSIONAL DERELICTION OF DUTY AND THE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
In September 2006, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) took to the
Senate floor to decry what he believed to be a patently unconstitu-
tional provision in the proposed Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA).2  The section of the MCA in question purported to strip
U.S. federal courts of jurisdiction over the habeas corpus claims of
alien enemy combatants, including detainees held at the U.S. Na-
val Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Senator Specter identified two significant problems with that
section.  First, the provision sought to eviscerate recent Supreme
Court decisions3 granting the detainees a right to have their habeas
claims heard in the District Court of the District of Columbia.4
Senator Specter feared that the removal of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion over these cases would “set back basic rights by some 900
years.”5
Second, and more fundamentally, Senator Specter believed
that this section of the legislation ran contrary to the plain text of
the Constitution.6  Under Article One, Section 9 of the Constitu-
tion, Congress may only suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times
of “rebellion or invasion”;7 it was clear to Senator Specter that
America was experiencing neither.  In an impassioned speech
before the National Press Club prior to the vote, Senator Specter
vowed not to “support a bill that’s blatantly unconstitutional,”8 and
2 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
3 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4 10 U.S.C.A. § 950g (West 2006).
5 152 CONG. REC. S10264 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
8 Nat Hentoff, Editorial, Protect the Constitution: Terror Suspects Deserve Habeas Corpus
Right, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A21.
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introduced an amendment that would have excised from the pro-
posed legislation the section purportedly stripping the courts of
habeas corpus jurisdiction.9  His proposed amendment failed by a
razor-thin margin, 51 to 48,10 and the provision that he had a day
earlier lambasted as unconstitutional remained part of the bill.11
And yet, incredibly, he voted in favor of the bill.
Nor was Senator Specter the only one to make such a choice.
The same habeas-stripping provision gave Senator Gordon Smith
(R-OR) “pause.”12  According to Senator Smith, denying detainees
habeas corpus rights amounted to a “frontal attack on our judiciary
and its institutions, as well as our civil rights laws” that threatened
to destroy a “cornerstone of our constitutional order.”13  Yet, de-
spite these grave reservations as to its constitutionality, Senator
Smith voted in favor of the MCA as well.14
On the House floor, a third member of Congress, Representa-
tive Robert Andrews (D-NJ), expressed “severe reservations” with
respect to the MCA.15  He found the habeas-stripping provision to
be constitutionally “ambiguous,” and, to boot, “not very wise.”16
He knew that the bill would require modifications in the Senate or
in the Conference Committee to cure its glaring constitutional de-
fects.  Yet, to “move it forward,”17 he punched “yes” from his House
seat and voted for the bill as well.18
The vote of each of these politicians in support of a bill he
believed to be unconstitutional constitutes a dereliction of his
sworn duty to support and defend the Constitution.  U.S. Senators
and Representatives are bound by the Constitution not to vote for
laws they believe to be unconstitutional.  This Article examines the
origins of this voting obligation, and how a shift from a traditional
Madison–Jackson model of coordinate construction has fueled the
misperception in the minds of legislators that the role of the judici-
ary is to “clean up” whatever unconstitutional laws Congress may
pass.  This Article explores the punitive consequences for Senators
and Representatives who vote for legislation they believe to be un-
constitutional; the obligations of the President with respect to such
9 152 CONG. REC. S10263 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
10 152 CONG. REC. S10369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (rollcall vote no. 255).
11 Id.
12 152 CONG. REC. S10364 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Smith).
13 Id.
14 152 CONG. REC. S10420 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (rollcall vote no. 259).
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legislation; and how the taint of improper voting should influence
a court examining the constitutionality of this bill and others
passed under similar circumstances.
As a final note, this Article is not about Senators and Repre-
sentatives voting for legislation that they believe to be constitu-
tional, though labeled unconstitutional by opponents.  Such
characterizations are part of the rhetoric of impassioned legislative
debate.  Nor is it about Senators and Representatives who vote for
legislation that they believe to be constitutional, but that is later
held by courts to be unconstitutional.  What is mandated is not per-
fect prescience of the courts’ behavior, but rather a good faith be-
lief in the constitutionality of the legislation for which they are
voting.
In addition, the conclusions of this Article are unaffected by
Arrow’s Theorem, which postulates that Senators and Representa-
tives, due to the nature of the voting process, are frequently not
able to vote for the version of a bill they would prefer, and must
instead vote for what they consider to be the lesser of two evils.19
The constitutional obligations of Senators and Representatives with
respect to voting are absolute.  The Constitution is unambiguous in
this respect.  No matter which version of a bill members of Con-
gress ultimately vote for, they may not vote for a version that they
believe to be unconstitutional.  This Article is thus limited to an
examination of the consequences of those instances in which Sena-
tors and Representatives, believing proposed legislation to be un-
constitutional, vote in favor of it anyway.
II. ROOTS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OBLIGATION
The primary source of the obligation of members of Congress
not to vote for legislation they believe to be unconstitutional is the
Congressional oath, taken by every member when he or she is
sworn into office.20  Support for this obligation can be found in the
modern judicial system, which habitually defers to the judgment of
Congress in presuming that legislation passed by Congress is con-
stitutional.  Additional validation is found within scholarly litera-
ture on the matter.
19 See Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of His-
tory, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1745, 1777 (2006) (defining Arrow’s Theorem as “the idea that a
vote involving a three-way split of opinion can create a majority result that no majority
actually supports”).
20 See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (setting forth the required oath of office for elected
officials).
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A. The Constitution
The oath of office stems from the requirement in Article Six
of the Constitution that members of Congress take an oath of of-
fice.21  The modern version of the congressional oath is set forth in
5 U.S.C. § 3331:
I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and de-
fend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose or evasion; and that I will well and faith-
fully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to
enter.  So help me God.22
It is true that neither the Constitution nor the congressional
oath explicitly prohibits members of Congress from voting in favor
of legislation they believe to be unconstitutional.  However, a close
textual analysis divines this meaning.  The obligation embodied in
the Congressional oath is to “support” the Constitution.  The Ox-
ford English Dictionary defines “support” as “[t]o endure without
opposition or resistance,” or “[t]o strengthen the position of by
one’s assistance, countenance, or adherence; to uphold the rights,
claims, authority, or status of; to stand by, back up.”23  By a plain
reading of the Oath, members of Congress are thus obligated to
strengthen the position of the Constitution, to uphold the authority of
the Constitution, and to stand by the Constitution.  It is this com-
monsense reading of the Oath that lays the foundation for the
widely held belief that Senators and Representatives are obligated
not to vote in favor of unconstitutional laws.
Louis Fisher highlights two sections of the Constitution as fur-
ther evidence of the implicit obligation of members of Congress to
conduct an independent analysis of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion prior to voting.  The explicit instructions contained within
these sections necessitate a preliminary determination of
constitutionality.
The Constitution mandates, for example, that “No Bill of Attain-
der or ex post facto law shall be passed.”  Accordingly, members
should make a constitutional determination on this issue prior
to, not after, a bill’s passage.  Similarly, the first amendment
commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
21 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound
by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”).
22 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
23 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
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lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.”  It would be unseemly for
members to legislate blindly, expecting the judiciary to correct
the constitutional problem at some future date.24
Fisher’s position is supported by the fact that there is nothing,
either in the cited language or the remaining language of those
sections, that in any way suggests that the required analysis would
be in contrast to the ordinary expectations of Congress.  The lan-
guage serves as guideposts for a preliminary constitutional analysis
it assumes members of Congress have already undertaken.
B. Validating the Obligation:  The Courts
In first-impression analyses of new laws, courts routinely begin
with the presumption that the law is constitutional.  It is a well-
established principle that federal courts assume the constitutional
validity of legislation passed by Congress, “[f]or it cannot be pre-
sumed that [Congress] would have expressly ratified and sanc-
tioned laws which they considered unconstitutional.”25  As Senator
Specter himself seemed to recognize, “[b]ecause Congress is
bound by the Constitution, its enactment of any law is predicated
at least implicitly on a judgment that the law is constitutional.”26
This presumption dovetails with the judiciary’s “canon of con-
stitutional avoidance,” which “comes into play only when, after the
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be
susceptible of more than one construction . . . .”27  When this oc-
curs, “the Court must adopt the one that avoids grave and doubtful
constitutional questions.”28
The canon of avoidance is limited to cases of statutory ambigu-
ity.  Its bias towards presumptive constitutionality29 is premised on
24 Fisher, supra note 1, at 719 (internal citations omitted).
25 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 312 (1827).
26 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990).
27 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 140 (2005) (citing Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)).
28 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 546 (2002).
29 This presumption of constitutionality fades when the law in question facially
threatens fundamental constitutional rights.  As articulated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938):
There may be [a] narrower scope for [the] operation of the presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation . . . [is] within a specific prohi-
bition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments
. . . . [L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
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the assumption that Congress would not intentionally pass uncon-
stitutional legislation.30  As articulated in Rust v. Sullivan, declaring
an “Act of Congress unconstitutional ‘is the gravest and most deli-
cate duty that this Court is called on to perform.’”31  This principle
is “followed out of respect for Congress, which [the Court] as-
sume[s] legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”32  Jus-
tice Brandeis expressed the same in his concurrence to Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority.33
C. Validating the Obligation:  Scholarly Literature
The scholarly literature is awash with support for the premise
that members of Congress are obligated not to vote for legislation
they believe to be unconstitutional.  As stated above, this obligation
is drawn first and foremost from the congressional oath.  “Faithful-
ness to their oath necessarily requires members of Congress . . . to
consider the constitutionality of proposed policies as an important
aspect of performing their duties.”34  John Yoo and Saikrishna
Prakash state this obligation more plainly, arguing that, consistent
with their duty to support the Constitution per the oaths clause,
“congressmen cannot enact laws that are unconstitutional.  Individ-
ual members of Congress . . . have the independent duty to review
the constitutionality of proposed legislation before them and to op-
pose unconstitutional laws.”35
Along those lines, it is not “improper for a member [of Con-
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny . . . than are most
other types of legislation.
Id.  Note that this caveat is restricted to a discrete class of legislation, and as such,
presents a narrowly-tailored exception to the general presumption of constitutional-
ity.  Congress should not count among its obligations an ability to predict the court’s
reaction with unerring accuracy to legislation it passes.  Even assuming such a remark-
able gift of prescience, we do not take the position that Senators and Representatives
are obligated to vote exclusively for legislation that they believe will not be overturned
by a court, merely not for legislation that they believe to be unconstitutional.
30 See Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally? The
Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional
Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1798, 1801 (2003).
31 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)).
32 Id.
33 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (recognizing the “long es-
tablished presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute”).
34 Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judi-
cial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 216 (1990).
35 Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1539, 1556 (2005).
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gress] to think seriously about constitutional . . . matters.”36
Rather, “[m]embers of the House are expected to consider the
constitutional issue when voting on the merits of the [proposed
legislation].”37  But as their own statements show, members of Con-
gress have at times shirked their responsibility.
III. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
The political momentum that culminated in the passage of the
Military Commissions Act can be traced back to three Supreme
Court decisions that undermined the Bush administration’s stance
with respect to certain military actions after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.  The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of
2001 prompted the arrival of the first planeload of detainees at the
Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on January 11, 2002.38
For two years, the U.S. government attempted to keep these indi-
viduals in complete isolation, arguing that they were afforded the
protection of neither U.S. laws nor the Geneva Conventions.39  The
United States took the further position that detainees could be
held there indefinitely under the commander-in-chief’s expanded
powers during wartime.40
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court rejected the govern-
ment’s assertion that the detainees had no right to bring their
cases to the U.S. court system, holding in Rasul v. Bush that Guantá-
namo detainees had a right to be heard in the District Court of the
District of Columbia.41  That same day, the government’s position
was dealt another blow when the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld that U.S. citizens held in the United States as enemy com-
batants could not be held indefinitely, but must be given a mean-
ingful opportunity to contest the factual basis of their detention.42
Following the Hamdi decision, the U.S. government hastily con-
structed a review tribunal system to make a showing that all detain-
ees were being given an opportunity to challenge the basis for their
36 Mark V. Tushnet, The Law, Politics, and Theory of Federal Courts: A Comment, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 454, 463 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
37 Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311,
362 (1987).
38 Katharine Q. Seelye, First ‘Unlawful Combatants’ Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at U.S.
Base in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at A7.
39 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1.
40 See id.
41 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
42 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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detention.43  The due process provided by the highly restrictive
Combatant Status Review Tribunals was suspect, however, and well
over 300 of the more than 500 detainees ultimately filed habeas
corpus petitions in the District Court of the District of Columbia.44
In response to what was characterized by the Administration
and its allies in Congress as a spate of frivolous litigation,45 Con-
gress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) to prevent
detainees from filing any new habeas petitions in the D.C. District
Court by stripping courts of jurisdiction to hear the petitions.46  Its
retroactive application to pending habeas cases was a matter of
contention, however, and the government’s stance was once again
rejected by the Supreme Court.47  In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Supreme Court ruled that the ad hoc military commissions es-
tablished by the U.S. government to try the handful of detainees
actually charged with a crime were not authorized by Congress and
were in fact in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the Geneva Conventions, and therefore illegal.48  The Su-
preme Court also noted, in response to a jurisdictional issue
briefed after passage of the DTA, that the DTA did not apply retro-
actively.49  But some members of the Court did make one addi-
tional, and significant, point: they noted that the Court openly
invited50 Congress to act, either by ratifying the procedures the Ex-
43 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the
Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d200407
07review.pdf.
44 Supplemental Brief of the Federal Parties Addressing the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 at 13, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-
5062–05-5064, 05-5095–05-5116).
45 U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., ENSURING LAWFUL DETENTION OF ENEMY
COMBATANTS WITHOUT CREATING NEW HABEAS CORPUS RIGHTS 7–8 (Dec. 18, 2006),
available at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Dec1806HABEASBB.pdf.
46 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–48, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat.
2680, 2741–43 (to be codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd–2000dd-1).
47 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763–69 (2006).
48 Id. at 2759.
49 Id. at 2763–69.
50 Notably, Justices Kennedy and Breyer authored concurring opinions inviting
Congress to respond to the Supreme Court’s ruling.
In sum, as presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds
the bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in §§ 836
and 821 of the UCMJ. Because Congress has prescribed these limits,
Congress can change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with the
Constitution and other governing laws. At this time, however, we must
apply the standards Congress has provided. By those standards the mili-
tary commission is deficient.
Id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  This invitation for congressional action is pre-
mised upon the control of domestic statutes in this case. The subsequent conclusion
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ecutive already had in place or by devising a new set of procedures
for the executive to use in trying enemy combatants.51
The MCA was designed to gain back the ground the Supreme
Court had taken away.  It established a new system of military com-
missions with the stamp of Congressional approval.52  It vested the
President with nearly unprecedented discretion to interpret the
United States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions.53  It also
sought to extend the habeas-stripping provisions of the DTA retro-
actively, such that all pending Guantánamo habeas cases would
have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.54  The MCA ultimately
passed the Senate by a vote of 65 to 34,55 and the House by a vote
of 253 to 168.56  One of the most hotly contested points was
whether Congress could and should strip courts of jurisdiction over
habeas petitions brought by the detainees.
Given the history and tradition behind the congressional oath,
how could members of Congress have willfully voted in favor of
legislation they publicly stated was less than constitutional?  The
answer lies in the changing relationship between the legislative and
judicial branches.
III. WHERE CONGRESS LOST ITS WAY
The historical record reflects that for the first hundred or so
years of its existence, Congress spent a considerable amount of
time debating the constitutionality of proposed legislation.  This
controversy was a reflection of the overlap among many of the orig-
inal Framers of the Constitution and the country’s first members of
Congress.  The current climate, in which the courts are viewed as
supreme arbiters of constitutionality and members of Congress
have a diminished obligation to perform an independent first re-
view, is the result of a nearly two-hundred-year shift away from what
is that “[i]f Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the
controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and other laws, it has the
power and prerogative to do so.” Id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  One concur-
rence goes on to find “Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the President
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.” Id. at 2799
(Breyer, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(a) (West 2006).
53 § 948b(b) & (f).
54 § 948d.
55 152 CONG. REC. S10420 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (rollcall vote no. 259).
56 152 CONG. REC. H7560 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (rollcall vote no. 491).
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we term the Madison–Jackson model of coordinate construction to
one of judicial superiority.
Early Congresses debated constitutional issues on a frequent
basis.  Paul Brest points to the 1789 removal power debate and the
debate in 1791 regarding the constitutionality of the first Bank of
the United States charter as examples of the seriousness with which
members of Congress regarded their duty to uphold the Constitu-
tion.57  The first Congress spent over a month debating whether
the President could remove without consultation officers he had
appointed with the approval of the Senate.58  The constitutionality
of chartering the first Bank of the United States was debated with
similar gravitas by both Houses of Congress.59
This perception of Congress as coequal with the other
branches of government with respect to constitutional interpreta-
tion is what we have termed the Madison–Jackson model.  During
the removal power debate, James Madison stated:
The Constitution is the charter of the people to the Govern-
ment; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and
marks out the departments to exercise them.  If the Constitu-
tional boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see
that any one of these independent departments has more right
than another to declare their sentiments on that point.60
Because of the seriousness with which Congress treated its ob-
ligation, the Supreme Court accorded a high degree of deference
to constitutional issues debated and resolved by the first Congress.
In deciding Myers v. United States, in which the presidential removal
power was expressly challenged, Chief Justice Taft looked to the
congressional debate of 1789, stating:
[T]his was the decision of the First Congress, on a question of
primary importance in the organization of the Government,
made within two years after the Constitutional Convention and
within a much shorter time after its ratification . . . and . . .
because that Congress numbered among its leaders those who
had been members of the Convention.61
More recently, Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
stated that the “earliest acts of Congress” should be given special
57 Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 83–84 (1986).
58 Id. at 83.
59 Id. at 84.
60 Fisher, supra note 1, at 710 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834)).
61 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926).
522 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:511
weight because of the “overlap of identity between those who cre-
ated the Constitution and those who first constituted Congress.”62
An oft-cited first step on the road to judicial superiority was
the landmark case Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice John
Marshall famously asserted that “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”63 Mar-
bury would mark the start of a gradual shift of deference to the
courts.  According to Brest, “[b]y the second half of the twentieth
century, both the House and the Senate had abandoned the tradi-
tion of deliberating over ordinary constitutional issues.”64  He cites
as examples the legislative debates over the Communist Control
Act of 1954, in which neither house succeeded in genuinely consid-
ering the constitutional arguments,65 and the passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, in which many institutional checks
and balances that govern the lawmaking process — namely com-
mittee hearings, outside experts, and committee reports — were
circumvented to bring the bill to a vote.66
Scholars, and even members of Congress themselves, have re-
cently argued that members of Congress are not even capable of
evaluating the constitutionality of new legislation.  This may be par-
tially attributed to a change in the perception of the role of the
elected official.  According to Owen Fiss, legislatures “are not ideo-
logically committed or institutionally suited to search for the mean-
ing of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function
in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the
people—what they want and what they believe should be done.”67
Former judge and member of Congress, Abner Mikva attributes
the lack of constitutional debate to a number of factors:
Structurally, both houses are large, making the process of en-
gaging in complex arguments during a floor debate difficult.
For the most part, the speeches made on the floor are designed
to get a member’s position on the record rather than to initiate
62 537 U.S. 186, 237 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  While the decision in Marbury did shift the
American court system away from the English model (in which courts merely inter-
preted laws passed by the legislature without questioning the right of the legislature to
pass such laws) to a more robust model in which the judiciary asserted its own inde-
pendent right to review the constitutionality of legislation, it avoided a direct confron-
tation with the executive branch by refusing to issue the writ of mandamus demanded
by Marbury. Id.
64 Brest, supra note 57, at 85.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 90.
67 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
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a dialogue.  Because of the volume of legislation, the time spent
with constituents, and the technical knowledge required to un-
derstand the background of every piece of legislation, it is infre-
quent that a member considers the individual merits of a
particular bill.  Often a vote is determined by a thumbs up-or-
down sign by the party leader, or by a political debt that needs
to be repaid.68
Ultimately, Mikva concludes that Congress “is not designed to
consider adequately the constitutional implications of every bill
before it.”69  Brest attributes the failure of Congress “to develop a
tradition of trustworthy constitutional decisionmaking” to the
“widespread assumption that issues of constitutional law belong ex-
clusively to the courts.”70
However, there is a difference between supremacy and exclu-
sivity, and nothing in Marbury implies that courts are the sole arbi-
ters of constitutionality.  In 1832, Andrew Jackson offered a theory
of coequal powers of interpretation that could trace its roots di-
rectly back to James Madison:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself
be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.  Each public
officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that
he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is under-
stood by others.  It is as much the duty of the House of Repre-
sentatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon
the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be
presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme
judges when it may be brought before them for judicial
decision.71
This is the essence of the Madison–Jackson model of coordi-
nate construction; that each house of Congress and the President
have an individual responsibility to assess the constitutionality of all
proposed legislation they are asked to pass into law.  It is a philoso-
phy that has been articulated by members of Congress throughout
the years.  Said Representative Fisher Ames (1st–4th Congresses):
“Let us examine the Constitution, and if that forbids our proceed-
ing, we must reject the bill . . . .”72  Senator Sam Ervin (83rd–93rd
Congresses) reiterated this sentiment: “Every Congressman is
68 Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983).
69 Id. at 610.
70 Brest, supra note 57, at 59.
71 Fisher, supra note 1, at 713 (citing 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1145 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
72 Note, supra note 30, at 1809 n.71.
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bound by his oath to support the Constitution, and to determine to
the best of his ability whether proposed legislation is constitutional
when he casts his vote in respect to it.”73  Strom Thurmond
(83rd–107th Congresses), a lion of the Senate for nearly fifty years,
argued on the Senate floor that a Member’s oath required that
“the very first step that he must or should take [in evaluating legis-
lation] is to determine, [i]s this legislation constitutional?  And if
he decides it is not, then he shouldn’t go any further.”74
Even as the legislative branch shifted from a Madison–Jackson
model to one of judicial superiority, many members of Congress
have stridently opposed a shunting of their responsibilities onto
the court system.  During the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Senator Paul Douglas (81st–89th Congresses), a proponent of the
bill, encouraged his colleagues to simply pass the legislation and let
the Supreme Court determine its constitutionality.75  His proposal
brought swift rebuke from his colleagues Senators John McClellan
(78th–95th Congresses) and Ervin, who argued that every Senator
is under an obligation to not vote for a bill he believes to be
unconstitutional.76
As Senator McClellan articulated during the same legislative
debate from which Senator Thurmond is quoted above, legislators
are “personally abdicating the responsibility with which [they] are
charged . . . if [they] do not ascertain . . . whether proposed legisla-
tion is constitutional . . . before it is enacted . . . .”77  Commentators
have similarly castigated members of Congress who seek to rid
themselves of this obligation:
Most scholars think that members of Congress fail to honor
their oaths to uphold the Constitution, or at least do not oper-
ate at their best, if they respond to such questions by saying,
“That’s for the courts to decide.”  Even worse, most scholars be-
lieve, is the response, “Sure, the legislation is unconstitutional,
but let’s enact it anyway and let the courts sort things out—or
take the heat for invalidating a popular program.”78
73 Brest, supra note 57, at 61 (quoting PETER SCHUCK, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
175 (1975).
74 Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 1131 (2005) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 10381 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond)).
75 DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 325 (1966).
76 Brest, supra note 57, at 88.
77 Goldstein, supra note 74, at 1131 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 10381 (1964) (state-
ment of Sen. McClellan)).
78 Mark Tushnet, Flourishing and the Problem of Evil, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1631, 1639
(1989).
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In sum, as Charles Mathias so cogently phrased it: “[T]here is a
positive obligation upon . . . each member of Congress . . . to inter-
pret the Constitution in the course of their daily duties.”79
IV. CONSEQUENCES
We now turn to the question of consequences for those who
either vote for legislation they believe to be unconstitutional, or
who are confronted by legislation tainted in that way.  How ought
Congress discipline Senators and Representatives who cast this type
of vote?  Under the Madison–Jackson model, how must a President
view legislation passed with improper voting?  In the judiciary, how
does improper voting impact the canon of avoidance?
A. Consequences: Members of Congress
The Constitution vests only the legislative branch with the
power to punish or expel its own members,80 in part because politi-
cal pressures stemming from the electoral process were thought to
be a sufficient check to allow Congress to police itself.  Reality,
however, tells a far different tale, as Congress has only rarely re-
sorted to punitive measures in dealing with members who have vio-
lated Congressional protocol.
Not once in the more than 220-year history of Congress has a
member ever been expelled (or even disciplined) for voting in
favor of a law he or she believed to be unconstitutional.  This his-
tory would seem at first to implicate the members referenced in
this Article as guilty of an ethical lapse never before seen in the
halls of Congress.  A careful review of the history of Congressional
discipline provides a more plausible explanation, however: the will-
ingness of Congress to discipline itself has simply grown weaker
over time.
Expulsion, the harshest punishment available to Congress,
reached its zenith at the time of the Civil War, and has rarely been
used since.  In the history of Congress only five members of the
House of Representatives and fifteen Senators have ever been ex-
pelled.81  Of the five Representatives, three were expelled when
79 Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Original Intent and the Constitution, Response to Com-
ments, 47 MD. L. REV. 234, 235 (1987).
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.”).
81 Kathy Kiely, Last Expulsion from House Was in 1980, USA TODAY, July 25, 2002, at
A10.
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their states seceded in 1861; the remaining two were expelled for
bribery and corruption in 1980 and 2002.82  Fourteen of the fifteen
Senators were expelled because their states seceded, and the fif-
teenth was expelled for treason in 1797.83
In recent times, Congress’ self-discipline measure of choice,
the censure, has itself given way to tongue-lashings of diminishing
force. The current rules of the House Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct authorize six levels of discipline: (1) expulsion
from the House of Representatives; (2) censure; (3) reprimand;
(4) fine; (5) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or
immunity of the member if under the Constitution the House of
Representatives may impose such denial or limitation; or (6) any
other sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate.84
Twenty-two members of the House have been censured, eleven of
these for insulting or treasonous language.85  Congress has recently
taken to issuing reprimands which amount to even less severe sanc-
tions imposed by the full House.86
The Senate, over time, has similarly moved away from severe
sanctions.  The Senate in its history has censured seven of its mem-
bers, two for violations of Senate ethics,87 as would likely be the
charge levied against a Senator voting for a law he or she believed
to be unconstitutional.  The Senate has also, in recent times, used
“denouncements” and committee-level “reprimands,” both of
which are understood to be somewhere below censure on the disci-
plinary scale.88
The historical record establishes that, over time, Congress has
grown increasingly hesitant to punish its members in meaningful
ways, preferring instead to rely on the ostensibly self-correcting
mechanisms of the political process and upon less severe actions
that bear a greater resemblance to rhetorical flourishes than mean-
ingful punishments.  From a practical standpoint, the likelihood
that members of Congress, were they even to characterize another
82 Id.
83 Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congres-
sional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 408 (1994).
84 COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES ONE HUN-
DRED NINTH CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 109-744, at 51 (2005), available at http://frweb
gate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr744.
109.pdf.
85 Ray, supra note 83, at 413.
86 Id. at 414–15.
87 Id. at 410.  Hiram Bingham was censured for his involvement with a lobbyist and
Thomas J. Dodd for misuse of campaign funds. Id. at 411.
88 Id. at 411–12.
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member’s vote as a dereliction of duty, would actually punish such
colleagues is very small.  This is due, in part, to the natural reluc-
tance each member likely harbors for the idea of punishing a col-
league (and, equally importantly, one who could retaliate by
punishing him or her down the road).
Moreover, with respect to impropriety in the votes for the
MCA, the party that would have led the sanctioning effort—the
GOP—is also the party whose President sought passage of the bill
so fervently.  From a political standpoint, then, there would be lit-
tle to gain—save perhaps a stand on principle—from a reprimand
of any sort of these members, whom the Administration was no
doubt pressuring strongly for an “aye” vote.89
B. Consequences:  The President
In line with the Madison–Jackson model of coordinate con-
struction, knowledge of voting impropriety should not affect the
President’s independent obligations.  As with members of Con-
gress, the roots of the President’s obligation are found in the oath
of office, as found in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution: “I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”90
The language “preserve, protect, and defend” parallels the
language of the congressional oath (“support and defend”),91 and
arguably imparts a heightened responsibility upon the chief execu-
tive compared to that of a member of the legislative body.  The
similarity in language connotes a similar obligation on the Presi-
dent to independently analyze new legislation and not vote for leg-
islation he or she believes to be unconstitutional.  By extension, if
presented with a bill he or she believes to be unconstitutional, the
89 The rise of the political party in contributing to this shift should not be under-
stated.  The road to powerful committee chairmanships in the House and Senate runs
through the political parties, who favor loyalty and seniority when making those deci-
sions.  Rare is the maverick Senator or Representative who is able to buck the party
line for very long and still retain positions of authority in a given Chamber.  To
deepen the problem, these Senators and Representatives depend upon the parties for
political support—financial and otherwise—in their reelection campaigns.  The net
result of this sort of political environment is members who kowtow to their political
party to the point of sacrificing fundamental obligations they owe to the Constitution
and to their constituents.
90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
91 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
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President, regardless of the political benefits of signing the bill into
law, is obligated by oath to veto it.
Does the President’s obligation change when he is confronted
with a bill he believes to be constitutional, but that members of
Congress voting in favor of it believe to be unconstitutional?  The
answer is no.  As described above, the Madison–Jackson model im-
poses upon each branch of government the obligation to perform
an independent analysis of constitutionality.  Ultimately, the Presi-
dent swears an equal and independent oath to that of members of
Congress, and must make an independent determination of the
constitutionality of new legislation.  If President Bush believed the
MCA to be constitutional, he was under no obligation to take into
account any voting impropriety by Congress in the bill’s passage.
C. Consequences:  The Courts
The voting pattern described above rebuts the presumption
underlying the canon of avoidance, namely, that Congress does not
vote in favor of unconstitutional legislation.  How, then, should this
influence a court weighing the constitutionality of legislation bear-
ing a clear record of voting impropriety?
The constitutional misgivings of the previously-identified
members of Congress were limited to the jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the MCA.  As the individual provisions of the MCA
are severable,92 we limit our discussion to how a court should de-
cide the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping provision
alone.
As previously noted, the canon of avoidance is limited to in-
stances of statutory ambiguity.  Where such ambiguity exists, the
court is directed to choose the statutory interpretation that would
avoid addressing issues of constitutionality.
92 The MCA does not contain a severability provision. But see Michael D. Shum-
sky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 243 (2004)
for a summary of the holding in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987):
“[S]tatutes are presumed to be severable unless . . . (1) Congress ‘intended otherwise’
. . . or (2) the remaining statutory structure cannot function independent of its un-
constitutional parts.”  As restated in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the
Court must “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” Id. at
258. “Indeed,” the Court continued, “we must retain those portions of the Act that
are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of ‘functioning independently,’ and (3)
consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute.” Id. at 258–59 (cita-
tions omitted).  We leave analysis of the constitutionality of the military commissions
themselves to other scholars, and simply note that the jurisdiction-stripping provision,
addressing as it does a topic entirely separate from the military commissions, is severa-
ble.  Indeed, the title of the legislation itself suggests that the jurisdiction-stripping
provision is not an essential component.
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But votes in favor of legislation believed to be unconstitutional
negate the premise of the canon of avoidance, namely, that Con-
gress has independently assessed the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion, which it subsequently voted for and did not find it wanting.
Consequently, there is no justification for the courts to defer to the
judgment of Congress in passing the legislation.  Some might ar-
gue that unless the improper votes were necessary for passage of
the bill, the fact that they occurred should not affect the court’s
posture.  Regardless of the number of improper votes, the court’s
treatment of the legislation should be the same.  Why should that
be the case?
To respond, we must put the question differently: is there a
meaningful difference between a law that would have passed Con-
gress without the votes of members of Congress who believed the
law to be unconstitutional, and a law that would not?  The answer
must be no.  Our objection to the canon of avoidance is not pre-
mised upon the principle that a sufficient number of the members of
Congress voting in favor of the legislation believed it to be uncon-
stitutional.  It is premised upon the principle that Congress does
not pass unconstitutional legislation.  It is about process, not tally,
and just as a single drop of ink taints an entire glass of water
equally, so too does the specter of improper voting taint the pas-
sage of a bill.
The canon of avoidance, therefore, should not be treated as
an absolute, but a rebuttable presumption, and in instances such as
the passage of the MCA, where some of its proponents believed it
to be unconstitutional, courts ought to deliberately consider the
statutory interpretation that raises constitutional issues, so that they
might confront head-on the controversies of a particular provision.
A failure to do so provides members of Congress with judicial cover
to ignore their constitutional obligation, and, in addition, impli-
cates the judiciary through its tacit sanction of procedurally uncon-
stitutional, and possibly substantively unconstitutional, legislation.
Anything less than the abandonment of the canon in situations like
these necessarily undermines the integrity of the judicial branch.
CONCLUSION
With a legislative body that has historically been too collegial
to stridently self-police, and a chief executive whose decisions with
respect to new legislation are made independently, the real impact
of improper voting by Congress must be felt by the body that has
historically accorded Congress’ decisions the most weight: the judi-
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ciary.  The canon of avoidance should simply not be adopted wher-
ever the taint of improper voting exists.
The gradual abdication of constitutional judgment by the leg-
islative to the judicial branch has created a perfect environment for
members of Congress to vote in favor of bills they believe to be
unconstitutional, purely for political gain.  While a more robust
disciplinary system in Congress might at first seem like an appro-
priate solution to this problem, the threat of sanction or censure is
ultimately not likely to dissuade members of Congress from this
behavior.  The simple end-around is that members would simply
stop vocalizing any negative opinions as to a bill’s constitutionality
and avoid reprimand entirely.  Thus, while their consciences may
be burdened by the thought of such a maneuver, there would be
no political danger for them.  Without a frameshift in the attitude
of members of Congress back towards the Madison–Jackson model
of coordinate construction, this type of dereliction of duty threat-
ens to become a mainstay of legislative procedure.
As borne out by the subsequent history of the MCA, bills
passed in this manner can be treated by the courts in a manner
entirely unforeseen by the derelict members.  Senator Specter
seemed to assume, without much basis, that the judiciary would
remedy the mistakes of Congress, saying in an interview, “I think
the courts will invalidate it . . . . They’re not going to give up au-
thority to decide habeas-corpus cases, not a chance.”93
Senator Specter could not have been more wrong.  On Febru-
ary 20, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, contrary to the Senator’s hopes, upheld the constitutional-
ity of the habeas-stripping provision of the MCA.94  Pointing to the
clear language of the bill that had been passed by Congress, the
Court of Appeals held that the petitioners’ arguments, while “crea-
tive,” would nevertheless “defy the will of Congress.”95  The lan-
guage of the DTA stripping detainees of habeas corpus rights
“could not be clearer”; it was as if the court could hear the bill’s
proponents “slamming their fists on the table” emphatically strip-
ping all detainees of their right to habeas corpus.96
Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari.  Sen. Specter took the unusual step of submitting an amicus
93 Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 54.
94 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06–1195).
95 Id. at 987.
96 Id.
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brief on their behalf, urging the High Court to hear the case and
ultimately restore habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo detainees.
After initially denying the petition on April 2, 2007 the Court
granted certiorari on June 29, 2007.97  Unlike the Hamdan Court,
however, the Court that heard this case included Chief Justice John
Roberts, who joined the 2005 Court of Appeals opinion denying
Salim Hamdan’s habeas corpus petition, at a time when no habeas-
stripping law was even in effect.98  As these events make clear, no
one can predict with certainty when the courts will take up the con-
stitutionality of a new law or what the outcome will be.  Congres-
sional reliance upon the courts as a failsafe is entirely misplaced, if
not foolhardy. In the meantime, of course, the law these members
of Congress publicly questioned yet still voted for is the law that
remains—indefinitely—on the books.
For these reasons, members of Congress must take seriously
their obligation not to vote for legislation they believe to be uncon-
stitutional.  Members of Congress must treat the judiciary as the
coequal branch that it is, not the safety net they may want it to be.
97 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (U.S. June
29, 2007).
98 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rev’d).

